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This paper develops a model of a two-candidate election in which the
candidates are mainly oﬃce-motivated but also to some (arbitrarily small)
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candidate has chosen a particular platform, the voters’ perception is that
she has, with positive probability, actually chosen some other platform. It
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“The strong convergence results in one dimension have proven rather robust;
equally robust have been the instability results in multiple policy dimensions.”
Gary M. Miller (1997: 1185)
1 Introduction
Since the classic contributions of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957), a large
body of literature on two-candidate elections has developed. Two main themes
in this literature have been the questions: (i) Where are the equilibrium plat-
forms of the candidates located? and (ii) Under what conditions do equilibria
(in pure strategies) exist in settings that are more general than the Hotelling-
Downs model? Concerning the first question, the famous answer is the so-called
full-convergence result: in equilibrium, the candidates choose the same platform,
namely the favorite policy of the median voter. As for the second question, a
common conclusion in the literature is that, if the policy space has more than
one dimension, an equilibrium in which the candidates do not randomize in their
platform choices exists only under conditions that are very stringent and which
fail to hold in many natural settings.1
This paper sheds light on the question whether these results are robust, that
is, whether the full-convergence result and the result that pure-strategy equi-
libria typically do not exist in settings with more than one dimension (or when
there is no Condorcet winner among the policy alternatives) still hold true if
one alters the model only slightly. There are two things that I simultaneously
add to the standard setting, although both are needed only in an arbitrarily
small amount for my results go through. First, I assume that the candidates
do not only care about winning the election; they also care about policy per
se. Second, I assume that the candidates’ platforms are noisy in the eyes of
the voters; that is, if a candidate has chosen a particular platform, the vot-
ers’ perception is that she has, with positive probability, actually chosen some
other platform. One may think of this assumption as representing (exogenous)
errors or misunderstandings in the transmission of information about the true
platforms from candidates via mass media to voters.2
1See, for example, Plott (1967) and McKelvey (1979) or the survey in Austen-Smith and
Banks (1999).
2While revising this paper I came across a new (now published) book manuscript by Gross-
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In the literature, the most commonly used approach for obtaining non-
convergence of equilibrium platforms is to assume that (i) the candidates are
policy-motivated (as well as oﬃce-motivated) and (ii) they are uncertain about
the outcome of the election. Papers that make these assumptions include Calvert
(1985), Roemer (1994), and Wittman (1983). The degree to which the platforms
diverge in these papers, however, varies continuously with the amount of uncer-
tainty and with the relative weight the candidates put on policy. In particular,
as either the amount of uncertainty or the weight on policy goes to zero, the
equilibrium platforms approach each other. Hence, with regard to these two as-
sumptions, the full convergence result is robust. As Calvert (1985: 70) argues,
this is an important result:
Such robustness against departures from the basic assumptions is vital
to the development of any positive theory. As a model of general process,
the basic multidimensional voting model serves mainly as a tractable guide
to our thinking about electoral competition (and to more detailed model-
ing), and not necessarily as a direct generator of hypotheses about real-
world elections. It must assume away many features of the real world. If
the model’s conclusions are robust against complications of that abstract
picture, then it has captured the essence of electoral competition; it is a
useful abstraction.
In the present paper, however, I show that such a robustness result fails to
hold if we allow the candidates’ platforms to be noisy in the sense described
above. More precisely, if the candidates are to some (arbitrarily small) extent
policy-motivated and if the platforms are to some (arbitrarily small) extent
noisy, then there is an equilibrium in which both candidates choose their fa-
vorite policies. This means that the platforms do not converge, and this non-
convergence result is obtained by altering the original Hotelling-Downs model
only slightly.3 Although the literature has identified many alternative ways of
man and Helpman (2001). In Chapter 3.2 of their book, these authors study an electoral-
competition game in which platforms are noisy in the same sense as here (although they
assume that the platforms are noisy in the eyes of only a fraction of the electorate; the oth-
ers observe the platforms perfectly). In the setting of Grossman and Helpman, however, the
candidates are not policy-motivated at all, which means that the phenomena studied in the
present paper do not arise. Instead the authors investigate how the location of the equilibrium
platforms change as the fraction of informed voters change.
3 In the first model that I develop, where the only features that are added to the stan-
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obtaining non-convergence, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no other result
of non-robustness.
The result that the candidates choose their favorite policies is close in spirit
to that of Alesina (1988). He points out that if the candidates care about
policy to some small extent and if they are not able to precommit to policy
platforms, then the candidates will, once they have been elected, implement
their own favorite policies. In the present paper, however, it is assumed that the
candidates can commit. Still, with the additional assumption that the platforms
are to some small extent noisy, it turns out that the candidates’ favorite policies
have a very strong drawing power. As a result, the equilibrium outcome is the
same as in Alesina’s model.
The second main contribution of this paper is to show that the typical non-
existence of pure-strategy equilibria in a setting where there is no Condorcet
winner among the policy alternatives can be remedied by, again, assuming that
the candidates are to some (arbitrarily small) extent policy-motivated and the
platforms are to some (arbitrarily small) extent noisy. I show that, if we slightly
alter the standard model in this fashion, there is an equilibrium in which the
candidates play pure; in particular, in this equilibrium, the candidates choose
their own favorite policies.
In order to facilitate an explanation of the results and the intuition behind
them, the paper starts out in Sections 2 and 3 by considering two simple ex-
amples. The example in Section 2 concerns the full-convergence result whereas
the example in Section 3 is about the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria
in a setting where there is no Condorcet winner among the policy alternatives.
In Section 4 a more general model is analyzed, and it is shown that the main
results from the two examples still hold true. This section can be skipped
by those readers who are only interested in the economic intuition behind the
results. The results and the insights in this paper draw heavily on an impor-
tant and thought-provoking paper by Bagwell (1995) on the robustness of the
dard Hotelling-Downs setting are policy preferences and noisy platforms, there are also full-
convergence equilibria which co-exist with the non-convergence equilibria. I argue, however,
that the equilibria with full convergence are fragile. The reason why they can exist is that,
in spite of the fact that it does not have a strict incentive to do so, the electorate may in a
particular way make its voting behavior contingent on the noisy signal that it observes. In
a plausible extension of the model, in which the electorate to some small extent also cares
about the identity of the winning candidate, I show that only non-convergence can be an
equilibrium.
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first-mover-advantage result in the industrial organization literature. Section 5
reviews this paper and some others that extend and criticize Bagwell’s analysis.
That section also provides a concluding discussion. An appendix contains proofs
of those results that are not proven in the main body of the paper.
2 Non-convergence of equilibrium platforms
Let us study the following very stylized electoral-competition game played be-
tween two candidates and one voter. The candidates first, simultaneously and
independently, choose one electoral platform each; candidate i’s (for i ∈ {1, 2})
chosen platform is denoted xi. The voter then casts his vote for one of the
candidates. The candidate who wins the election (i.e., the one who is voted for
by the single voter) must implement her previously chosen platform.4 There
are three policy alternatives, Left (L), Center (C), and Right (R). In order to
make the example as simple as possible, however, the candidates’ choice sets are
restricted so that candidate 1 is constrained to choose her platform x1 from the
set {L,C}, and candidate 2 must choose her platform x2 from the set {C,R}.5
I will carry out the analysis under two alternative assumptions about the
informational structure of the game. The first assumption says that the voter,
prior to making his voting decision, can observe the candidates’ chosen plat-
forms perfectly. The second assumption says that the platforms are noisy ; that
is, the voter can observe only an (exogenous) signal about the candidates’ plat-
forms. The signal is denoted s = (s1, s2), where s1 ∈ {L,C} and s2 ∈ {C,R}.
The signal technology works as follows. When a candidate chooses a particular
platform, the voter will observe a signal specifying that same platform with
probability 1 − ε; if the signal does not specify the right platform, then the
other possible platform is specified (see Table 1). The realizations of s1 and s2
are independent. The noise parameter ε is strictly positive, but it should be
thought of as being small; in particular it is assumed that ε ∈
¡
0, 13
¤
.
4The assumption that electoral promises are binding will be discussed in Section 5.
5All three players will be allowed to randomize between their available pure actions. The
notation needed for such mixed strategies will be introduced later.
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Pr (s1 = es | x1 = ex) es = L es = Cex = L 1− ε εex = C ε 1− ε
Pr (s2 = es | x2 = ex) es = C es = Rex = C 1− ε εex = R ε 1− ε
Table 1: The signal technology. The probability that each “sub-signal” si is
correct equals 1 − ε, and the two sub-signals s1 and s2 are independent. It is
assumed that ε ∈
¡
0, 13
¤
.
The three players have preferences over the policy alternatives L, C, and
R, although the two candidates primarily care about being in oﬃce (a candi-
date “is in oﬃce” if she has won the election). In particular, each candidate
receives an incremental payoﬀ of 1 if being in oﬃce and an incremental payoﬀ
of 0 otherwise. In addition, each candidate receives an incremental payoﬀ of
a ∈
¡
0, 14
¢
if her favorite policy is implemented; candidate 1’s favorite policy
is L and candidate 2’s favorite policy is R. The voter gets a payoﬀ of 1 if his
favorite policy C is implemented and a payoﬀ of 0 if either policy L or policy R
is implemented. In sum, the players’ payoﬀs are described in Table 2.
candidate 1 candidate 2 voter
1L 1 + a 0 0
1C 1 0 1
2C 0 1 1
2R 0 1 + a 0
Table 2: The players’ payoﬀs. The abbreviation 1C (respectively, 2C) means
that candidate 1 (respectively, 2) is in oﬃce and chooses policy C, and similarly
with the abbreviations 1L and 2R. It is assumed that a ∈
¡
0, 14
¢
.
Below the two versions of the model will be analyzed in turn. Before doing
that, however, it will be useful to describe formally the strategies that are avail-
able to the players; at the same time some necessary notation can be introduced.
First consider the game with perfect observability. Here, a strategy for candidate
1 is a number pO ∈ [0, 1], where pO is the probability with which candidate 1
chooses her favorite policy L. (The subscript O is short for “observable.”) Simi-
larly, a strategy for candidate 2 is a number qO ∈ [0, 1], where qO is the probabil-
ity with which candidate 2 chooses her favorite policy R. The voter’s strategy is
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a function that specifies with what probability the voter casts his vote for each
candidate given a particular platform configuration. We can thus describe the
voter’s strategy by a vector with four components, rO =
¡
rLCO , r
LR
O , r
CC
O , r
CR
O
¢
,
where each component rjkO ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which the voter elects
candidate 1 if the platform configuration is (x1, x2) = (j, k).
Now consider the version of the model where the platforms are noisy. Here
the candidates’ strategies have the same form as in the case with observable
platforms. That is, a strategy for candidate 1 is a number pN ∈ [0, 1], where pN
is the probability with which candidate 1 chooses her favorite policy L. (The
subscript N is short for “noisy.”) Similarly, a strategy for candidate 2 is a
number qN ∈ [0, 1], where qN is the probability with which candidate 2 chooses
her favorite policy R. The voter’s strategy is, again, a function, although here
it is not a function of the actual platforms (since these are unobservable) but of
the signal s. Hence, the voter’s strategy can be described by a vector with four
components, rN =
¡
rLCN , r
LR
N , r
CC
N , r
CR
N
¢
, where each component rjkN ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability with which the voter elects candidate 1 if the signal is s = (j, k).
2.1 Observable platforms
Let us first analyze the version of the model where the platforms are perfectly
observable. The solution concept that will be used here is that of subgame
perfect equilibrium. We can therefore solve the model by backward induction.
Hence, let us begin by considering the voter’s decision for whom to vote, given
that he has observed some platforms x1 and x2. Clearly, if candidate 1 has
chosen C and candidate 2 has chosen R, then the voter will elect candidate
1 (rCRO = 1); and if candidate 1 has chosen L and candidate 2 has chosen C,
then the voter will elect candidate 2 (rLCO = 0). For the two remaining possible
platform configurations, the voter is indiﬀerent between the candidates; this
means that the probabilities rCCO and r
LR
O can take on any value between zero
and one.
We can substitute this optimal behavior on the part of the voter into the
expressions for the candidates’ expected payoﬀs. Doing this yields the following
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2 × 2 game matrix:
x2 = C x2 = R
x1 = L 0, 1 r
LR
O (1 + a) ,
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a)
x1 = C r
CC
O , 1− rCCO 1, 0.
(1)
The first expression in each cell of the matrix is candidate 1’s expected payoﬀ
and the second one is player 2’s expected payoﬀ. Now look at the special case
where the candidates get elected with equal probability whenever the voter is
indiﬀerent between them: rCCO = r
LR
O = 1/2. The game matrix above then
simplifies to the following.
x2 = C x2 = R
x1 = L 0, 1
1+a
2 ,
1+a
2
x1 = C
1
2 ,
1
2 1, 0
(2)
Clearly, since a < 1, this game between the two candidates has a unique Nash
equilibrium where both of them, with probability one, choose platform C.
For the general case where the probabilities rCCO and r
LR
O can take on any
value between zero and one, the analysis is a bit more involved, and it is therefore
relegated to the Appendix. The result, however, is in line with the above:
in any equilibrium, the candidate who wins the election chooses platform C
with probability one. Indeed, in those equilibria in which rCCO ∈ (0, 1), both
candidates choose platform C with probability one. We have the following.
Proposition 1. Consider the version of the model where the platforms are
perfectly observable. This model has a continuum of subgame perfect
equilibria. In any one of these equilibria, either:
a)
¡
pO, qO, r
LC
O , r
LR
O , r
CC
O , r
CR
O
¢
=
¡
0, 0, 0, rLRO , r
CC
O , 1
¢
, for any rCCO ∈ (0, 1)
and rLRO ∈ [0, 1]; or
b)
¡
pO, qO, r
LC
O , r
LR
O , r
CC
O , r
CR
O
¢
=
¡
pO, 0, 0, r
LR
O , 0, 1
¢
, for any pO and rLRO
such that pO
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≤ 1; or
c)
¡
pO, qO, r
LC
O , r
LR
O , r
CC
O , r
CR
O
¢
=
¡
0, qO, 0, r
LR
O , 1, 1
¢
, for any qO and rLRO
such that qOrLRO (1 + a) ≤ 1.
This is an example of the full-convergence result. The candidates primar-
ily care about winning the election, and the voter will elect a candidate who
chooses the voter’s favorite policy C (if anyone of the candidates does this).
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Hence, there is a pressure on the candidates to choose the voter’s favorite policy
instead of their own ones. Although there always exist equilibria in which one
of the candidates chooses her own favorite policy with positive probability (and
sometimes even with probability one), such a candidate must lose the election
for sure.
2.2 Noisy platforms
Let us now turn to the version of the model where the platforms are noisy. This
game is quite a bit more complex than the game with observable platforms.
Indeed, only writing down an expression for each candidate’s expected payoﬀ
will require a fair amount of space. We can write such an expression somewhat
more succinctly, however, by using matrix notation. To this end, let us define
the following two matrices:
Π ≡
µ
rLCN r
LR
N
rCCN r
CR
N
¶
, E ≡
µ
1 1
1 1
¶
.
We can now write candidate 1’s expected payoﬀ, given her opponent’s strat-
egy qN and the voter’s strategy rN , as
EU1 (pN , qN , rN ) = pN (1 + a)
¡
1− ε ε
¢
Π
µ
(1− qN) (1− ε) + qNε
qN (1− ε) + (1− qN ) ε
¶
+(1− pN )
¡
ε 1− ε
¢
Π
µ
(1− qN ) (1− ε) + qNε
qN (1− ε) + (1− qN ) ε
¶
.
(3)
In order to understand this expression, it is instructive to first look at the case
where candidate 1 chooses her own favorite policy with probability one, pN = 1.
Here the second term of (3) vanishes, and candidate 1’s expected payoﬀ equals
1 + a (which is her payoﬀ if winning with her favorite platform) times the ex
ante probability that she will win the election when pN = 1, the latter being
expressed as a product of three matrices. This ex ante probability thus equals a
weighted average of the probabilities rjkN , where the weights are the probabilities
that the signal s = (j, k) will realize. In particular, the first row of Π (which
consists of the probabilities rLCN and r
LR
N ) will be selected with probability 1−ε
whereas the second row (which consists of the probabilities rCCN and r
CR
N ) will be
selected with probability ε. The columns of Π will be selected with probabilities
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that depend on the noise parameter ε and the probability that candidate 2
chooses her favorite policy, qN .
If candidate 1 chooses C instead of L (i.e., if pN = 0), then two things
change. First, if she wins the election, then her payoﬀ equals 1 instead of 1+ a,
since she here will win with a policy that is not her favorite one. Second, now the
first row of Π is selected with probability ε and the second row with probability
1− ε, which means that here the probabilities rCCN and rCRN are the most likely
ones to be selected.
The expression for candidate 2’s expected payoﬀ can be written as
EU2 (pN , qN , rN ) =
µ
pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε
(1− pN ) (1− ε) + pNε
¶t
(E −Π)
µ
ε
1− ε
¶
(1 + a) qN
+
µ
pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε
(1− pN ) (1− ε) + pNε
¶t
(E −Π)
µ
1− ε
ε
¶
(1− qN) ,
(4)
where the superscript t denotes the transpose of a matrix. The logic of this
expression is the same as the one for candidate 1’s expected payoﬀ, although
here one must use E − Π instead of Π since for each realization of the signal
candidate 2 will win with probability 1− rjkN .
The voter’s expected payoﬀ at the stage where he has observed a signal
s = (j, k) can be written as
EU jk3
³
pN , qN , r
jk
N
´
= rjkN Pr (x1 = C | s1 = j) +
³
1− rjkN
´
Pr (x2 = C | s2 = k) .
(5)
In words, the voter’s expected payoﬀ is equal to the probability that the candi-
date that he casts his vote for has chosen platform C. This is because the voter’s
payoﬀ is unity if the winning candidate has chosen C and zero otherwise. The
probabilities Pr (xi = C | si = j) can be calculated by the voter with the help
of Bayes’ rule. In particular one has
Pr (x1 = C | s1 = C) = (1− pN ) (1− ε)
pNε+ (1− pN ) (1− ε)
, (6)
Pr (x1 = C | s1 = L) = (1− pN ) ε
pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε
; (7)
the corresponding expressions for candidate 2 is the same as above except that
qN is substituted for pN .
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In the version of the model with noisy platforms, subgame perfection does
not have any bite. This is simply because here there are no subgames (except
for the subgame that consists of the whole game). It is therefore natural to focus
attention on the set of all Nash equilibria, which is what I will do. A strategy
profile (p∗N , q
∗
N , r
∗
N ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
EU1 (p
∗
N , q
∗
N , r
∗
N) ≥ EU1 (pN , q∗N , r∗N ) for all pN , (N1)
EU2 (p
∗
N , q
∗
N , r
∗
N) ≥ EU2 (p∗N , qN , r∗N ) for all qN , (N2)
EU jk3
³
p∗N , q
∗
N , r
jk∗
N
´
≥ EU jk3
³
p∗N , q
∗
N , r
jk
N
´
for all rjkN , (N3)
where (N3) must hold for all four possible signals s = (j, k) and where r∗N ≡¡
rLC∗N , r
LR∗
N , r
CC∗
N , r
CR∗
N
¢
. In words, for a particular strategy profile to be a
Nash equilibrium, the strategy of each player must be a best response to the
strategies of the other two players.
To start with, let us look for a Nash equilibrium in which each candidate
chooses her own favorite platform with probability one, i.e., where (p∗N , q
∗
N ) =
(1, 1). Surprisingly, it turns out that such an equilibrium indeed exists. To
see this first notice that, given the specified behavior on the part of the can-
didates, the four equilibrium conditions in (N3) will be satisfied for any r∗N .
This is simply because if both candidates choose their own favorite platforms
with probability one, the voter’s payoﬀ is zero regardless of which candidate
he elects; as a consequence, no matter which signal he has observed, the voter
will be indiﬀerent between the candidates.6 It remains to check conditions (N1)
and (N2). These will be satisfied if and only if EU1 (1, 1, r∗N) ≥ EU1 (0, 1, r∗N )
and EU2 (1, 1, r∗N ) ≥ EU2 (1, 0, r∗N ). Using (3) and (4) together with (p∗N , q∗N ) =
(1, 1), these inequalities can after some straightforward algebra be written as
rLCN ε+ r
LR
N (1− ε)
1− ε− ε (1 + a) ≥
rCCN ε+ (1− ε) rCRN
(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε , (8)
1− rLRN +
¡
rLRN − rCRN
¢
ε
1− ε− ε (1 + a) ≥
1− rLCN +
¡
rLCN − rCCN
¢
ε
(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε . (9)
6One can verify this formally by plugging pN = 1 into the expressions for
Pr (x1 = C | s1 = j) in (6) and (7), which yields zero. Similarly, qN = 1 implies
Pr (x2 = C | s2 = j) = 0. Hence, from (5) one has that EUjk3
³
1, 1, rjkN
´
= 0 for all rjkN .
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Let ΩLR be the set of all rN ∈ [0, 1]4 such that inequalities (8) and (9) are
satisfied. One can readily verify that any vector (k, k, k, k), where k ∈ [0, 1],
belongs to ΩLR; that is, for example, if the voter always randomizes fifty-fifty
or always votes for one of the candidates, then rN belongs to ΩLR.
Hence, in the version of the model where the platforms are noisy, there
exist Nash equilibria in which the candidates’ platforms do not converge. This
result stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 1 and the full-convergence result
in general. For the present result to hold, the candidates must to some extent
care about policy (a > 0) and the platforms must to some extent be noisy
(ε > 0). However, the result holds for any small a and ε greater than zero. The
basic reason why this kind of equilibrium can exist is that although the voter
cannot observe the platforms directly, he (correctly) believes that the candidates
have chosen their own favorite platforms with probability one. Moreover, the
voter rationally infers that if his beliefs are correct, a signal indicating that a
candidate has chosen C must be wrong. Hence, the voter may just as well ignore
the signal and, for example, regardless of which signal he has observed vote for
each candidate with equal probability. If so, however, a candidate who were
to choose platform C rather than her favorite platform would not be rewarded
with a higher probability of winning. As a consequence, the candidates will be
better oﬀ by indeed choosing their own favorite platforms, which confirms the
voter’s beliefs about their behavior. I will shortly return to a further discussion
of this kind of equilibrium.
In this model, the equilibria with non-convergence are not the only ones that
exist. There are also equilibria with full convergence, that is, where (p∗N , q
∗
N ) =
(0, 0). To see this first notice that, here again, the equilibrium condition (N3)
will be satisfied for any r∗N . For if both candidates choose platform C with
probability one, the voter’s payoﬀ is unity regardless of which candidate he
elects. This means that full convergence will be an equilibrium if and only if
EU1 (0, 0, r
∗
N ) ≥ EU1 (1, 0, r∗N ) and EU2 (0, 0, r∗N ) ≥ EU2 (0, 1, r∗N ). Using (3)
and (4) together with (p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (0, 0), these inequalities can be written as
rLRN ε+ r
LC
N (1− ε)
1− ε− ε (1 + a) ≤
rCRN ε+ r
CC
N (1− ε)
(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε , (10)
12
1− rCRN + ε
¡
rCRN − rLRN
¢
1− ε− ε (1 + a) ≤
1− rCCN + ε
¡
rCCN − rLCN
¢
(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε . (11)
Let ΩCC be the set of all rN ∈ [0, 1]4 such that inequalities (10) and (11) are
satisfied. For example, the vector
¡
rLCN , r
LR
N , r
CC
N , r
CR
N
¢
=
¡
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 1
¢
belongs
to ΩCC . That is, if the voting behavior is such that candidate 1 (respectively,
candidate 2) is punished by getting elected with zero probability if the voter
observes a signal s = (L,C) (respectively, a signal s = (C,R)), then both
candidates’ choosing platform C can be part of an equilibrium.
One may wonder whether there are other kinds of equilibria, for example in
which one or both candidates randomize between the platforms, that co-exist
with the ones that are discussed above. The following lemma tells us that this
is not the case.
Lemma 1. Consider the version of the model with noisy platforms. If (p∗N , q
∗
N )
is part of a Nash equilibrium of this model, then either (p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (1, 1)
or (p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (0, 0).
The proof of Lemma 1, which is relegated to the Appendix, proceeds in two
steps. First it is shown that in any Nash equilibrium one must have p∗N = q
∗
N .
The reason for this is that if, say, p∗N < q
∗
N , the voter would, for most signal
realizations, prefer candidate 1 to candidate 2; the only chance for candidate 2
to win the election with positive probability would be if the voter observed the
signal s = (L,C). This creates an incentive for candidate 2 to choose platform
C with probability one, which contradicts the assumption that p∗N < q
∗
N . The
second step of the proof is to make use of the fact that if indeed p∗N = q
∗
N ∈ (0, 1),
then both candidates must be indiﬀerent between their pure actions. But if
candidate 1 is indiﬀerent between her pure actions, then this again will create
an incentive for candidate 2 to choose platform C with probability one, which
contradicts the assumption that q∗N ∈ (0, 1).7
The following proposition, which follows from Lemma 1 and the arguments
in the text above, summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. Consider the version of the model with noisy platforms. There
are two kinds of Nash equilibria of this model: either both candidates
7 It is in the proof of Lemma 1 that the assumptions ε ≤ 1
3
and a < 1
4
are used.
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choose their own favorite platforms (i.e., (p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (1, 1)) and the voter
votes according to r∗N ∈ ΩLR; or both candidates choose platform C (i.e.,
(p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (0, 0)) and the voter votes according to r
∗
N ∈ ΩCC .
2.3 Discussion and an extension
Hence, in any Nash equilibrium the candidates either both choose platform
C (full convergence) or they both choose their own favorite platforms (non-
convergence). Which one of these kinds of equilibria should we expect to be
played? Clearly, the voter’s payoﬀ in an equilibrium with full convergence is
greater than in one with non-convergence. Thus, if the voter somehow could
avoid the equilibria in which the candidates choose their own favorite platforms,
he would have an incentive to do so. One may argue that the voter should
indeed be able to avoid the non-convergence equilibria by voting according to,
for example,
¡
rLCN , r
LR
N , r
CC
N , r
CR
N
¢
=
¡
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 1
¢
. As a matter of fact, as long as
the voter expects the candidates to behave symmetrically relative to each other
(i.e., as long as pN = qN ), then this kind of behavior is weakly optimal for him:
although the voter does not have a strict incentive to vote like this, it does not
cost him anything either.8
This argument, however, critically relies on the model feature that the voter
is exactly indiﬀerent between the candidates when they have (or are believed to
have) chosen the same platform. In the real world, voters typically do not only
care about candidates’ policy platforms but also about their leadership abilities,
their looks, etc. If the voter in our model, because of such a reason, strictly
preferred one candidate to the other when their platforms are (or are believed
to be) identical, then the voting behavior described above would not be optimal
for him.
We can formalize this idea in a simple way by assuming that the voter has
the following lexicographic preferences: primarily he cares about policy, and
his policy preferences are exactly as described in Table 2. But if the voter is
indiﬀerent between the candidates as far as their platforms are concerned, then
he strictly prefers one of the candidates. In order to retain the symmetry of the
8 It is important to note that this does not mean that the voter uses a weakly dominated
strategy in the equilibria with non-convergence. For if we had pN 6= qN , then choosing, for
example, some rLRN ∈ (0, 1) would be suboptimal for the voter.
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model (which is desirable since we want it to remain tractable), let us suppose
the identity of the favorite candidate is private information to the voter, and
that both candidates assign the probability 1/2 to the event that the favorite is
candidate 1. The rest of the model is exactly as before.
Let us first look at how the analysis of the version of the model where the
platforms are perfectly observable is aﬀected by this alternative assumption
about the voter’s preferences. In this case, the probabilities rCCO and r
LR
O will,
from the perspective of the candidates, equal 1/2. Hence, the game matrix
depicted in (1) always simplifies to the one in (2). As a consequence, in this
version of the model there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both candidates
choose platform C.
Next, consider the version of the model where the platforms are noisy. It can
be verified that the proof of Lemma 1 is still valid under the alternative assump-
tion that the voter has the lexicographic preferences described above. Hence, in
any equilibrium we must have either full convergence or non-convergence. Can
full convergence be an equilibrium? The answer is No. For if both candidates
are expected to choose platform C, the voter will, for all signals, be indiﬀerent
between the candidates as far as their platforms are concerned; hence, the voter
will elect his favorite candidate with probability one. This means that, from the
perspective of the candidates, rLCN = r
LR
N = r
CC
N = r
CR
N = 1/2. But if the can-
didates expect to be elected with the same probability for all signals, they will
have an incentive to deviate to their own favorite platforms. As a consequence,
full convergence cannot be part of an equilibrium. A similar reasoning shows
that non-convergence (i.e., (p∗N , q
∗
N ) = (1, 1)) is indeed part of an equilibrium.
9
9 In order to get a clear understanding of why the voter is not able to avoid the non-
convergence equilibria, the following observation may be helpful. If the voter could, at an ex
ante stage, make a credible commitment to some voting behavior rN , then he would have a
strict incentive to commit to, for example, rN =
¡
0, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
¢
rather than some rN ∈ ΩLR
(since he strictly prefers full convergence to non-convergence). Yet at the time he actually is
voting, the voter will – given that he has the specified lexicographic preferences – strictly
prefer one candidate to the other, which means that voting according to rN =
¡
0, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
¢
will
not be ex post optimal for him. Rather, the rN that is ex post optimal for the voter has all
of its four components equal to zero or one; hence, from the perspective of the candidates,
the voter’s perceived ex post optimal behavior is given by rN =
¡
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
¢
, which belongs
to ΩLR but not to ΩCC . We may because of this reason think of the phenomenon that only
equilibria with non-convergence can exist as being due to a time-inconsistency problem.
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3 Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
Now consider the following simple electoral-competition game played between
two candidates and three voters. The candidates are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} and
the voters by j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. There are again three policy alternatives, Left (L),
Center (C), and Right (R), although now both candidates are free to choose
any policy. The sequence of events is also the same as in the previous section.
First the two candidates simultaneously and independently choose platforms,
xi ∈ {L,C,R}. Then the three voters simultaneously and independently vote
for one of the candidates. The candidate who receives a majority of votes wins
oﬃce and must implement her previously chosen platform.
In a first version of the model all three voters can, prior to casting their
votes, observe the candidates’ chosen platforms perfectly. In a second version
of the model, voter 2 can only observe a noisy signal s ∈ {L,C,R} about can-
didate 2’s platform; voter 2 can observe candidate 1’s platform perfectly, and
voters 1 and 3 can observe both candidates’ platforms perfectly.10 The signal
technology is similar to the one in the previous section. More specifically, when
candidate 2 chooses a particular platform, then voter 2 will observe a signal
specifying that same platform with probability 1 − ε; if the signal does not
specify the right platform, then the two other platforms have an equal chance
of being specified (see Table 3). The noise parameter ε is strictly positive, but
it should be thought of as being small; in particular it is assumed that ε ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
.
Pr (s = es | x2 = ex) es = L es = C es = Rex = L 1− ε ε/2 ε/2ex = C ε/2 1− ε ε/2ex = R ε/2 ε/2 1− ε
Table 3: The signal technology. The probability that the signal s is correct
equals 1− ε, where ε ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
.
The five players’ payoﬀs are specified in Table 4. The voters’ payoﬀs are
such that voter 1 prefers L to R and R to C; voter 2 prefers C to L and L to
10That is, it is only the platform of one of the candidates that is noisy, and this platform is
noisy only in the eyes of one of the three voters. This modeling choice serves two purposes.
First, it shows that only a very small amount of noise is needed for the results to go through
(but it is important both which candidate’s platform is noisy and in the eyes of which voter).
Second, and more importantly, it simplifies the analysis. The more general model in Section
4 will assume that both candidates’ platforms are noisy in the eyes of all voters.
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R; and voter 3 prefers R to C and C to L. These preferences are chosen to
make sure that there is no policy alternative that is a Condorcet winner. That
is, if the voters vote directly on policy alternatives (and if they vote for their
favorite policies), then there is no alternative that can beat both the other ones
in a pairwise comparison: L ≺ C ≺ R ≺ L (where “≺” means “is beaten in a
pairwise comparison by”). It is also assumed that although the voters primarily
care about policy, they also to some extent care about the identity of the winning
candidate, with candidate 1 being their favorite (this is captured by the term
λ ∈ (0, 1)).11 The candidates have payoﬀs that are similar to the ones in the
model of the previous section: although they are mainly oﬃce-motivated they
also to some extent care about policy per se (which is captured by the term
a ∈ (0, 1)); candidate 1’s favorite policy is L, and candidate 2’s favorite policy
is R.
candidate 1 candidate 2 voter 1 voter 2 voter 3
1L 1 + a 0 1 + λ λ −1 + λ
2L a 1 1 0 −1
1C 1 0 −1 + λ 1 + λ λ
2C 0 1 −1 1 0
1R 1 a λ −1 + λ 1 + λ
2R 0 1 + a 0 −1 1
Table 4: The players’ payoﬀs. It is assumed that a,λ ∈ (0, 1).
3.1 Observable platforms
To start with, let us consider the version of the model where the platforms
are perfectly observable. We are looking for the subgame perfect equilibria of
this game. I also impose the requirement that no voter uses a weakly domi-
nated strategy. That is, even if a voter’s vote does not change the outcome of
the election, he votes for a candidate if he prefers that candidate to the other
candidate.12 From Table 4 it follows that candidate 2 will win the election in
three cases, namely if the platforms are (x1, x2) = (R,L), (x1, x2) = (L,C), or
11The assumption that the voters are biased in favor of candidate 1 is made for the sake of
tractability: it simplifies the analysis considerably since it breaks ties.
12 In this subsection, all five players will be allowed to randomize between their pure actions.
(Notation for such mixed strategies will be introduced shortly.) In Section 3.2, however, I will
only look for equilibria in which the candidates play pure (since the point with the analysis
there is to show that there exists an equilibrium in which the candidates do not randomize).
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(x1, x2) = (C,R). For any other platform configuration candidate 1 will win
the election.
Substituting this optimal behavior on the part of the voters into the ex-
pressions for the candidates’ expected payoﬀs yields the following 3 × 3 game
matrix:
x2 = L x2 = C x2 = R
x1 = L 1 + a, 0 0, 1 1 + a, 0
x1 = C 1, 0 1, 0 0, 1 + a
x1 = R a, 1 1, a 1, a.
(12)
As in the model in the previous section, candidate 1 is the row player and
candidate 2 is the column player, and the first expression in each cell of the
matrix is candidate 1’s payoﬀ and the second one is player 2’s payoﬀ. It can
easily be verified that the game depicted in (12) does not have any pure-strategy
equilibrium. Of course, however, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium of this
game. In fact, there is a unique equilibrium of the game in which both candidates
are randomizing over all three policy alternatives. Let σi (k) be the probability
with which candidate i chooses platform xi = k, for k ∈ {L,C,R}. The proof
of the following proposition is fairly straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Proposition 3. Consider the version of the model with perfect observability.
This model has only one Nash equilibrium that is both subgame perfect
and in which the voters do not use weakly dominated strategies. In this
equilibrium the candidates behave as follows:
σ1 (L) =
1− a2
3− a2 ; σ1 (C) =
1− a
3− a2 ; σ1 (R) =
1 + a
3− a2 ;
σ2 (L) =
1
3− a2 ; σ2 (C) =
1 + a− a2
3− a2 ; σ2 (R) =
1− a
3− a2 .
We see that if a, the parameter that measures the strength of the candidates’
policy preferences, is small, both candidates choose all three platforms with
approximately the same probability (one third).
3.2 Noisy platforms
Let us now turn to the version of the model where candidate 2’s platform is
noisy in the eyes of voter 2. The solution concept that will be employed here is
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that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium: each one of the five players is required to
make an optimal choice at any information set where he or she has a move.13
I also impose the requirement that no voter uses a weakly dominated strategy.
In the rest of this section and in the proof of Proposition 4, I will refer to such
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium simply as an “equilibrium.”
It turns out that in this model there is indeed an equilibrium in which none
of the candidates is randomizing in their choice of platform. In particular, there
is an equilibrium in which both candidates choose their own favorite policies.
To see this, suppose that candidate 1 indeed chooses L and candidate 2 indeed
chooses R. Voter 2 cannot observe candidate 2’s choice directly, only the noisy
signal; he correctly believes, however, that candidate 2 chooses R. This means
that voter 2 will vote for candidate 1 no matter which signal s he has observed
(remember that voter 2 prefers L to R; see Table 4). Moreover, voter 1 will
vote for candidate 1 and voter 3 will vote for candidate 2. Hence, the winner is
candidate 1. It remains to check that none of the candidates has an incentive
to deviate. Candidate 1 certainly does not have such an incentive, since she is
winning with her favorite policy. Nor does candidate 2 have a (strict) incentive
to deviate since this would not make her win. The reason for this is that voter
2 cannot observe her chosen platform directly and rationally ignores the signal.
Hence, if candidate 2 deviated to C, for example, voter 2 would not change his
voting behavior. Voters 1 and 3 can indeed observe candidate 2’s deviation; their
preferences, however, are such that they still would not change their behavior
(see Table 4). If deviating to L, candidate 2 certainly would not win.
There also exists another equilibrium where both candidates play pure,
namely where both candidates choose L with probability one. In this equi-
librium, too, candidate 2 loses the election with probability one. The following
result is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Consider the version of model with noisy platforms. In this
model there is an equilibrium in which candidate 1 chooses L with prob-
ability one and candidate 2 chooses R with probability one. There is also
an equilibrium in which both candidates choose L with probability one.
13As in Section 2.2, subgame perfection does not have any bite, since there are no subgames.
Moreover, Nash equilibrium is too weak because here voters 1 and 3 can observe the platforms
perfectly, which means that some information sets may be oﬀ the equilibrium path.
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There is no other equilibrium in which none of the candidates is random-
izing in her choice of platform.
4 A general model
Consider a model of an electoral competition with two candidates, labeled j ∈
{1, 2}, and n ≥ 1 voters, labeled i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.14 The sequence of events is as
follows. First the candidates simultaneously commit to platforms xj ∈ X ⊂ <d
(for some positive integer d). Second, the voters observe the chosen platforms
with some, possibly very small, noise. Formally, each voter i observes a signal
si = (si,1, si,2) ∈ S = X2, where each si,j is independently drawn from a density
function f (· | xj) which has positive support on the whole of X. Finally, each
voter casts his vote for one of the candidates. The candidate who receives the
largest number of votes wins oﬃce and gets his chosen policy implemented. In
case of a tie, each candidate wins with equal probability.
On the part of the candidates, only pure strategies will be considered. Hence,
a strategy for candidate j is a vector xj with d components. The voters, however,
are allowed to randomize in their voting decisions. A strategy for voter i is a
mapping ri from the set of possible signals, S, to the one-dimensional unit
simplex, [0, 1]. Let us make the interpretation that ri (si) is the probability that
voter i votes for candidate 1 conditional on having observed a signal si. Denote
a vector of voting decisions by r = (r1 (s1) , . . . , rn (sn)).
Each voter has preferences over the policy space X and the set of candidates
{1, 2} that can be represented by the utility function U i(x, j), where x is the
winning candidate’s policy. The candidates care about being in oﬃce and about
policy, although the latter is possibly of only slight importance. Candidate j’s
utility if policy x is implemented and she is (respectively, is not) in oﬃce is
V j (x, 1) (respectively, V j (x, 0)). It is assumed that there is an bxj ∈ X such
that, for j ∈ {1, 2},
V j (bxj , 1) > V j (x, 1) , ∀x 6= bxj ,
14 It is worthwile emphasizing that the model that will be presented here will in some respects
not be more general than the examples analyzed in the previous sections. For example, in
contrast to what we assumed in Section 2, mixed strategies on the part of the candidates will
not be allowed. Moreover, in contrast to what we assumed in Section 3, neither the voters
nor the candidates will be allowed to use a weakly dominated strategy.
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and that
V j (bxj , 1) > V j (bxj , 0) .
Hence, each candidate has a favorite policy bxj and – at least if her favorite
policy is implemented – a candidate prefers to be in oﬃce to not be in oﬃce.
From what is said above it follows that, at the stage where a candidate is
to choose her platform, she does not know what signals the voters will observe.
Nor does she know what the realizations of any mixed strategies on the part
of the voters will be. Hence, the outcome of the election will be uncertain for
her.15 Given a vector of voting decisions r and a pair of platforms (x1, x2), let
P j (x1, x2, r) be the probability that candidate j wins the election. The candi-
dates and the voters are assumed to be expected utility maximizers. Candidate
j’s expected utility is denoted by EV j , where
EV j (x1, x2, r) = P
j (x1, x2, r)V
j (xj , 1) + P
k (x1, x2, r)V
j (xk, 0)
for j, k ∈ {1, 2} and k 6= j. Voter i’s expected utility at the stage where he makes
his voting decision is denoted by EU i. Since the candidates are constrained to
use pure strategies and, in an equilibrium, the voters correctly anticipate the
candidates’ actions, the signals that the voters observe will not be informative
about the chosen platforms. Hence, we can write voter i’s expected utility as
EU i (x1, x2, r) = P
1 (x1, x2, r)U
i(x1, 1) + P
2 (x1, x2, r)U
i(x2, 2).
The equilibrium concept employed is that of Nash equilibrium (conditions
(E1) and (E3) below). In addition it is required that none of the players is
in equilibrium using a strategy that is weakly dominated (conditions (E2) and
(E4)). Formally, an equilibrium of the model described is a pair of platforms
(x∗1, x
∗
2) and a list of voting decisions r
∗ = (r∗1 (s1) , . . . , r
∗
n (sn)) such that: (E1)
for all j, k ∈ {1, 2} and k 6= j,
EV j (x∗1, x
∗
2, r
∗) ≥ EV j (xj , x∗k, r∗) , ∀xj;
(E2) there is no x
0
j ∈ X such that
EV j
³
x
0
j , xk, r
´
≥ EV j
¡
x∗j , xk, r
¢
, ∀ (xk, r) ,
15Yet another source of uncertainty is the above-mentioned fact that, in case of a tie, a
lottery will decide which candidate wins.
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for all j, k ∈ {1, 2} and k 6= j, with the inequality holding strictly for some
(xk, r); (E3) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all si ∈ S,16
EU i (x∗1, x
∗
2, r
∗) ≥ EU i
¡
x∗1, x
∗
2, ri, r
∗
−i
¢
, ∀ri;
and (E4) there is no r
0
i such that
EU i
³
x1, x2, r
0
i, r−i
´
≥ EU i (x1, x2, r∗i , r−i) , ∀ (x1, x2, r−i) ,
with the inequality holding strictly for some (x1, x2, r−i).
Proposition 5. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, in any equilibrium both
candidates choose their own favorite policies.
PROOF: Recall from the model description that the candidates are con-
strained to play pure. That is, candidate j must choose xj = x
0
j with probability
one for some x
0
j ∈ X. We need to show that (i) there exists such an equilibrium
and (ii) in any such equilibrium x
0
j = bxj for all j ∈ {1, 2}. Let us first prove
(i). Suppose both candidates choose their own favorite policy with probability
one, i.e., xj = bxj . Moreover, suppose that none of the voters makes his voting
choice contingent on the signal but votes for candidate j if U i(bxj , j) > U i(bxk, k)
for k 6= j; and if U i(bx1, 1) = U i(bx2, 2), then voter i randomizes in some fashion
that is not contingent on the signal. Let the corresponding vector of voting
decisions be denoted by br; the probability that candidate j wins the election is
thus P j (bx1, bx2, br). We must show that none of the candidates and none of the
voters has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from this behavior, and that their
strategies are not weakly dominated (i.e., that conditions (E1)-(E4) are satis-
fied). First, consider candidate 1. For this candidate not to have an incentive
to deviate unilaterally, condition (E1) must be satisfied. This requires that
EV 1 (bx1, bx2, br) ≥ EV 1 (x1, bx2, br)⇔ P 1 (bx1, bx2, br) £V 1 (bx1, 1)− V 1 (x1, 1)¤ ≥ 0.
(13)
If P 1 (bx1, bx2, br) = 0, then this inequality holds with equality. If P 1 (bx1, bx2, br) >
0, then (13) simplifies to V 1 (bx1, 1) ≥ V 1 (x1, 1), which is true by definition of
16 I here use the standard notation r∗−i =
³
r∗1 (s1) , . . . , r
∗
i−1 (si−1) , r
∗
i+1 (si+1) , . . . , r
∗
n (sn)
´
.
A similar notation is also used below.
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bx1. For candidate 1’s strategy not to be weakly dominated, condition (E2) must
hold. For condition (E2) not to hold, there must exist an x
0
j such that
EV 1
³
x
0
1, bx2, r´ ≥ EV 1 (bx1, bx2, r)⇔ P 1 (bx1, bx2, r) hV 1 ³x01, 1´− V 1 (bx1, 1)i ≥ 0
for all r. This inequality, however, is not satisfied for any r such that P 1 (bx1, bx2, r) >
0. Hence, condition (E2) must hold. For candidate 2 the arguments above are
analogous. Now consider a voter. For a voter not to have a unilateral incentive
to deviate, condition (E3) must be met. If voter i’s vote cannot change the out-
come of the election, then this condition clearly holds (with equality). Suppose
that voter i’s vote can change the outcome of the election. Then condition (E3)
requires that he votes for his favorite candidate. This is consistent with what
we postulated above about the voters’ behavior. Finally, for a voter’s strategy
not to be weakly dominated, condition (E4) must hold. This condition is met if
voter i always votes for his favorite candidate whenever U i(bx1, 1) 6= U i(bx2, 2).
This is also consistent with the above postulated behavior.
Let us now prove (ii). Suppose, per contra, that there is an equilibrium in
which x
0
1 6= bx1 (the case x02 6= bx2 follows the same logic). Now candidate 1’s
strategy, however, is weakly dominated; i.e., condition (E2) is violated. To see
this one only needs to note that whenever r is such that P 1 (x1, x2, r) > 0, candi-
date 1 can gain by deviating to bx; and whenever r is such that P 1 (x1, x2, r) = 0,
candidate 1’s choice of platform does not aﬀect her payoﬀ. ¤
5 Concluding discussion
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the results and the insights of this
paper draw heavily on an article by Bagwell (1995). He develops a game in
which one player moves first and then a second player, before making his own
move, observes a noisy but possibly almost perfect signal about the first player’s
action. The players’ payoﬀs are such that, if there were no noise at all, player 1
would benefit from his opportunity to move first. Bagwell’s leading example is
two oligopolists who compete in quantities – as is well known, the equilibrium
profit of the leader in a Stackelberg duopoly is greater than a Cournot duopolist’s
equilibrium profit. Bagwell shows, however, that under a certain regularity
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condition,17 “the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes for the noisy-
leader game coincides exactly with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
outcomes for the associated simultaneous-move game” (Bagwell, 1995: 272).
In other words, when the leader’s action is observed only with some (possibly
very small) noise, then in any pure-strategy equilibrium the Cournot outcome
is obtained instead of the Stackelberg outcome. Hence, Bagwell concludes, the
first-mover advantage is eliminated.
Let us relate Bagwell’s results to the ones in Section 2 of the present paper.
In the model there, when the candidates’ platforms are perfectly observable
(Section 2.1) the unique equilibrium outcome involves full convergence, which
corresponds to the Stackelberg outcome in Bagwell’s game. If instead all three
players made their moves simultaneously, we would get non-convergence18 (the
Cournot outcome in Bagwell’s game). In the version of the model where the
platforms are chosen before the voter’s decision but are noisy (Section 2.2), we
can, as in Bagwell’s model, sustain the same outcome as in the simultaneous-
move game, i.e., non-convergence. But in our electoral-competition game this is
not the unique outcome: there also exist equilibria with full convergence. The
reason for this is that in that game the regularity condition imposed by Bagwell
is not satisfied. In the extension with lexicographic preferences (Section 2.3),
however, we eﬀectively imposed such a condition and, accordingly, only non-
convergence could be part of an equilibrium.
In the literature following Bagwell’s paper, two objections to his conclu-
sion that the first-mover advantage is eliminated by the introduction of a small
amount of noise have been raised.19 First, some scholars have criticized Bag-
well’s focus on pure-strategy equilibria. For example, van Damme and Hurkens
(1997) show that in Bagwell’s game and under his regularity condition, there
17Namely that the player moving last has, given any action of the first player, a unique
best-reply action.
18To see this, notice that any candidate who expected to get elected with positive probability
would have a strict incentive to choose her own favorite platform instead of the voter’s. The
equilibrium outcome of such a game would thus be identical to the outcome of the non-
convergence equilibria in the game where the platforms are chosen before the voter’s decision
but are noisy.
19 In the electoral-competition game there is actually not a first-mover advantage but a first-
mover disadvantage (since the candidates are worse oﬀ when their actions are observed). What
is relevant for that game is the fact that the introduction of a small amount of noise may give
rise to non-convergence (the Cournot outcome) instead of full convergence (the Stackelberg
outcome).
24
always exists a mixed equilibrium that induces an outcome that is close to the
equilibrium outcome of Bagwell’s game without any noise.20 They also suggest
an equilibrium-selection theory that selects this mixed equilibrium.21 Similarly,
Güth, Kirchsteiger, and Ritzberger (1998) study an extension of Bagwell’s game
in which there are a set of leaders who all move simultaneously, whereupon
another set of players, the followers, observe noisy signals about the leaders’
actions and then choose their actions simultaneously. This extension is particu-
larly interesting for us, since we can think of the set of leaders as candidates in
an electoral competition and the set of followers as voters. The main result of
Güth et al. is that, for almost all games they consider, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated
by (possibly mixed) equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise.22 This
result, however, relies on generic payoﬀs, so it does not necessarily hold true in
knife-edge cases.
Are the results of the present paper susceptible to the criticism that one
should not confine attention to pure-strategy equilibria? The analysis in Sec-
tion 3.2 does not at all consider the possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria.
This neglect should be excused, however, since the challenge there was to find
a remedy to the phenomenon that in the standard electoral-competition model
there is no equilibrium in which the candidates do not randomize. The analysis
in Section 2 indeed allowed for mixed strategies, and it was shown that a mixed
equilibrium does not exist – on the other hand, in the noisy-platform model
in Section 2.2 there exist pure-strategy equilibria with full convergence. In the
20The existence of such a mixed equilibrium was noted by Bagwell (1995), too, although in
the context of a specific example.
21There are also a couple of other papers that – using diﬀerent approaches and reaching
diﬀerent conclusions – investigate the problem of equilibrium selection in Bagwell’s model.
Oechssler and Schlag (2000) carry out an evolutionary-game-theory analysis of a simple version
of Bagwell’s model. They find that the pure-strategy equilibrium (i.e., the Cournot outcome)
is selected by most evolutionary dynamics. Huck and Müller (2000) report on an experimental
test of Bagwell’s prediction. They do not find empirical support for his focus on the pure-
strategy equilibrium.
22 It is interesting to note that this result does not necessarily hold for any subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game with no noise. This may be important because in an electoral-
competition game with many voters who vote strategically there are typically many subgame
perfect equilibria (some of them unreasonable). For in each subgame (i.e., given a pair of
platforms) there are always many Nash equilibria; for example, all voters voting for one of the
candidates is an equilibrium, because given this voting behavior no single voter can gain by
a unilateral deviation. Such unreasonable behavior in the subgames can support equilibrium
behavior on the part of the candidates that also is unreasonable. Hence, it might be, in
principle, that only one of the unreasonable subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be
approximated by (possibly mixed) equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise.
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extension with lexicographic preferences in Section 2.3, however, we did not
have full-convergence equilibria nor mixed ones. Still, this result is likely to be
sensitive to the assumption that the voter’s preferences over the identity of the
winning candidate enter lexicographically. Suppose instead that the voter – as
in the model in Section 3 – have more standard (in particular, continuous) pref-
erences over the identity of the winning candidate. Then we should expect that
even though a pure-strategy equilibrium with full convergence would not exist,
a mixed equilibrium would; moreover, the outcome of this mixed equilibrium
should be located close to the full-convergence outcome. This calls for some
caution when drawing conclusions from the analysis: If one studied a model
that allows for mixed equilibria and if the noise in the signal is small, then one
may find a mixed equilibrium with almost full convergence besides the pure ones
with non-convergence, and, if so, it is not clear which kind of equilibrium would
be played.
The second objection that has been raised against Bagwell’s conclusion, put
forward by Maggi (1999),23 is that it is sensitive to the introduction of un-
certainty about the leader’s type. Maggi develops a model that is similar to
Bagwell’s but in which the leader has private information about a parameter
in her payoﬀ function.24 Under this assumption, the noisy signal that the fol-
lower observes is informative about the leader’s action also when the leader is
expected to play a pure strategy. Maggi shows that the extent to which there is
a first-mover advantage in this model depends on the relative magnitude of the
uncertainty about the leader’s type and the noise in the signal; in particular, in
a linear-normal version of his model, the equilibrium outcome moves smoothly
from the Stackelberg outcome (when the ratio between the noise in the signal
and the noise in the leader’s type is small) to the Cournot outcome (when this
ratio is large). This result suggests an interesting extension of the analysis of
the present paper, namely an electoral-competition game where the candidates
also have private information about their policy preferences and where the pol-
icy space is continuous. In such a setting, I conjecture that each candidate’s
equilibrium platform will be located in between this candidate’s favorite policy
23See also Adolph (1996), who makes a related point.
24This parameter is not directly payoﬀ relevant to the follower (e.g., it could be a cost
parameter or, in our setting, a parameter measuring the strength of a candidate’s policy
preferences), which means that signaling is not an issue.
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and the one of the median voter. Moreover, how close to the median voter’s
favorite policy and how close to each other the platforms will be located should
depend on the relative magnitude of the noise in the signal and the uncertainty
about the candidates’ types.25
An important assumption that was made throughout the paper is that the
candidates can commit to electoral platforms (even though which platform they
have committed to is not perfectly observable). The usual justification for this
assumption is that, although feasible in principle, deviating from an announced
platform is prohibitively costly because of the candidates’ concerns for their rep-
utation. Such reputational concerns were formally modeled by Alesina (1988),
within the framework of a repeated game with an infinite horizon; see also Dixit,
Grossman, and Gul (2000) for a generalization of Alesina’s work. In Alesina’s
as well as in Dixit et al.’s framework, a political outcome “in the middle” is sus-
tained through punishment strategies on the part of the two candidates: each
candidate punishes her opponent in case the opponent deviates. Alternatively,
one could construct a similar model where the punishments were carried out by
the voters. In either case, it is important that any deviation can be observed
by the punisher.
This suggests that, also in a setting in which candidates cannot commit, the
model feature that the candidates’ choices (of actual policies or of announced
policy platforms) can only be imperfectly observed may have important impli-
cations for the location of equilibrium policies. This should be particularly true
if the signals that the players observe about the candidates’ actions are private
to the receiver of the signal: What is the credibility of, say, candidate 2’s (or
the voters’) threat to punish particular actions if candidate 1 cannot observe
candidate 2’s (noisy) observation of her action? An interesting topic for future
research would be to explore these questions in a formal model; for a related
analysis within a seller-buyer framework, see Bhaskar and van Damme (2000).
It is my hope that the insights from the analysis of the present paper, with its
single-period setting and its commitment assumption, will constitute a first step
25A third limitation of Bagwell’s argument has been pointed out by Fershtman and Kalai
(1997). They show that his result does not hold for any kind of signal technology. In particular,
if (i) the signal that the follower observes is correct with some positive probability and (ii)
when this happens the follower knows that the signal is correct, then Bagwell’s result as well
as the ones in the present paper break down. Yet another paper that is closely related to
Bagwell’s is Levine and Martinelli (1998).
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in understanding those more far-reaching questions.
Let me conclude by relating to a recent discussion in Persson and Tabellini
(2000) on the role of the commitment assumption. They refer to models making
this assumption as models of preelection politics. In such models, “[t]he essen-
tial political action [...] takes place in the electoral campaign, and the role of
the election is to select a particular policy” (p. 11). In models of postelection
politics (i.e., where electoral promises are not binding), “the role of elections is
very diﬀerent [...]. Rather than directly selecting policies, voters select politi-
cians on the basis of their ideology, competence, or honesty, or more generally,
their behavior as incumbents” (pp. 12-13). Persson and Tabellini are of the
opinion that existing research has not produced a clear consensus concerning
the question whether electoral promises are binding or unimportant, and they
call for more work on this issue: “progress in the field depends on our finding
a way of resolving some of these tensions, building a bridge between pre- and
postelection politics” (p. 14).
The results of the present paper can hopefully constitute a small contribution
to that research agenda by showing that, even if electoral promises are assumed
to be binding, a small amount of noise in the transmission of these promises to
the electorate can make the model look like one of post- rather than preelection
politics: The candidates’ own policy preferences have an even stronger drawing
power than has been acknowledged in the previous literature.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Let us first look for Nash equilibria of the reduced-
form game in (1) where rCCO ∈ (0, 1). It is immediate from the game matrix
that (pO, qO) = (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium of this game. One may also easily
verify that neither (pO, qO) = (0, 1) nor (pO, qO) = (1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium.
It turns out that under the assumption that a < 1, nor can (pO, qO) = (1, 1)
be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, suppose that this is indeed a Nash equi-
librium. Then for candidate 1 not to have an incentive to deviate, we must
have rLRO (1 + a) ≥ 1, and for candidate 2 not to have an incentive to deviate,
we must have
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≥ 1. These two conditions together imply that
a ≥ 1– a contradiction. Hence, when rCCO ∈ (0, 1), the only pure-strategy Nash
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equilibrium of the game is the one where both candidates play C, i.e., where
(pO, qO) = (0, 0). Since there is only one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, there
can be no equilibrium in mixed strategies. This gives us the result stated under
a). Next, let us look for Nash equilibria of the reduced-form game in matrix (1)
where rCCO = 0. First, in any Nash equilibrium of this game, qO = 0. To see this,
suppose that qO > 0. Then we must have pO
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≥ 1; otherwise
candidate 2 will have an incentive to play C with probability 1. This condition
implies
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≥ 1 and pO > 0. The condition pO > 0 in turn implies
that qOrLRO (1 + a) ≥ qO; otherwise candidate 1 will have an incentive to play C
with probability 1. This condition in turn implies that rLRO (1 + a) ≥ 1, which
together with the previously derived condition
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≥ 1 imply that
a ≥ 1 – a contradiction. Given that qO = 0, candidate 1 is indiﬀerent between
playing L and C. In order to have a Nash equilibrium where candidate 2 plays
C with probability one and where candidate 1 randomizes with some probabil-
ity pO, we must have pO
¡
1− rLRO
¢
(1 + a) ≤ 1. This gives us the result stated
under b). It only remains to consider the possibility that rCCO = 1. This case,
however, is analogous to the previous one; the result is stated under c). ¤
Proof of Lemma 1 The proof proceeds in two steps. First it will be
shown that, in any Nash equilibrium, pN = qN . Next it is shown that, in any
Nash equilibrium and given that qN = pN ≡ p, either p = 0 or p = 1.
In order to prove that in any Nash equilibrium pN = qN , suppose, per
contra, that pN 6= qN . Because of symmetry, we can without any further loss
of generality assume that pN < qN . This implies rCCN = r
LR
N = r
CR
N = 1.
To see this, let us calculate the voter’s expected utility if voting for candidate
1 respectively candidate 2 upon observing the signal s = (s1, s2) ∈ {L,C} ×
{C,R}. The voter uses Bayes’ rule to update his beliefs about candidate i ’s
platform upon observing the signal si:
Pr (xi = exi | si = esi) = Pr (si = esi | xi = exi) Pr (xi = exi)Pexi∈{L,C,R} Pr (si = esi | xi = exi) Pr (xi = exi) . (14)
By using the formula in (14), we get
Pr (x1 = ex1 | s1 = es1) es1 = L es1 = Cex1 = L (1−ε)pN(1−ε)pN+ε(1−pN) εpNεpN+(1−ε)(1−pN)ex1 = C ε(1−pN)(1−ε)pN+ε(1−pN) (1−ε)(1−pN )εpN+(1−ε)(1−pN) (15)
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and
Pr (x2 = ex2 | s2 = es2) es2 = C es2 = Rex2 = C (1−ε)(1−qN )(1−ε)(1−qN )+εqN ε(1−qN)ε(1−qN)+(1−ε)qNex2 = R εq(1−ε)(1−qN )+εqN (1−ε)qNε(1−qN)+(1−ε)qN (16)
Now, using the above tables and the payoﬀ matrix in Table 2 in the main body
of the paper, we get the following expressions for the voter’s expected utility:
esi = L esi = C esi = R
EU (vote for 1 | s1 = es1) ε(1−pN)(1−ε)pN+ε(1−pN ) (1−ε)(1−pN )εp+(1−ε)(1−pN) −−−
EU (vote for 2 | s2 = es2) −−− (1−ε)(1−qN )(1−ε)(1−qN )+εqN ε(1−qN )ε(1−qN )+(1−ε)qN .
(17)
Using the expressions in (17) it is easily verified that pN < qN impliesEU (vote for 2 | s2 = C) <
EU (vote for 1 | s1 = C), which in turn implies rCCN = 1. In a similar fashion one
can check that pN < qN also implies rLRN = r
CR
N = 1.
Next, note that pN < qN and rCCN = r
LR
N = r
CR
N = 1 together imply
rLCN < 1. This is because if r
LC
N = 1, candidate 1 would win with certainty
no matter which platform she chose, which means that she should choose her
favorite platform x1 = L; but this in turn implies pN = 1 ≥ qN .
Finally, let us show that the above implications in turn imply qN = 0,
which contradicts the assumption that pN < qN . The equality qN = 0 holds
if EU2 (pN , 0, rN ) > EU2 (pN , 1, rN ) or, using (4) together with rCCN = r
LR
N =
rCRN = 1,
[pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε]
¡
1− rLCN
¢
(1− ε) > [pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε]
¡
1− rLCN
¢
(1 + a) ε,
(18)
which always holds since we know from above that rLCN < 1 and by assumption
ε ∈
¡
0, 13
¤
and a ∈
¡
0, 14
¢
.
We have thus established that in any Nash equilibrium, pN = qN . It thus
remains to show that pN = qN ∈ (0, 1) cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose, per contra, that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which pN = qN ∈
(0, 1). This implies that rLCN = 0 and r
CR
N = 1; see (17) above. It is also implied
that both candidates must be indiﬀerent between their two available actions.
For candidate 1 we get the condition U1 (1, qN , rN) = U1 (0, qN , rN ). Using (3),
rLCN = 0, r
CR
N = 1, qN = pN , and carrying out some algebra, this condition
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simplifies to
rLRN [pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε] [(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε]
=
©
rCCN [(1− pN ) (1− ε) + pNε] + pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε
ª
[1− ε− ε (1 + a)]
(19)
or rLRN = K0 + r
CC
N K1, where
K0 =
1− ε− ε (1 + a)
(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε , K1 =
[(1− pN ) (1− ε) + pNε] [1− ε− ε (1 + a)]
[pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε] [(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε]
.
But this implies that candidate 2 will strictly prefer C to R. To see this, rewrite
the condition U2 (pN , 0, rN ) > U2 (pN , 1, rN ) as©¡
1− rCCN
¢
[(1− pN ) (1− ε) + pNε] + pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε
ª
[1− ε− ε (1 + a)]
>
¡
1− rLRN
¢
[pN (1− ε) + (1− pN ) ε] [(1− ε) (1 + a)− ε] , (20)
or rLRN > r
CC
N K1 + 1 −K1 −K0. Using rLRN = K0 + rCCN K1 from above, this
inequality simplifies to K1 > 1− 2K0. It can readily be verified that under the
conditions pN ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈
¡
0, 13
¤
, and a ∈
¡
0, 14
¢
, K1 > 0 whereas 1− 2K0 < 0.
Hence, we have indeed U2 (pN , 0, rN ) > U2 (pN , 1, rN ), implying qN = 0. This,
however, contradicts the assumption that qN ∈ (0, 1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4 The existence of an equilibrium in which both
candidates choose their favorite policies is already proven in the paragraphs
preceding Proposition 4. Let us verify that there indeed exists an equilibrium
in which both candidates choose L with probability 1. Clearly, for this platform
configuration, candidate 1 will win the election (all three voters will vote for her).
Hence, candidate 1 will not have an incentive to deviate. Nor does candidate
2 have a (strict) incentive to deviate to any one of the other platforms. If
candidate 2 deviated to either R or C, then she would get voter 3’s vote but
not voter 1’s, and voter 2 would not change his voting behavior since he cannot
observe the deviation. Hence, candidate 2 cannot change the outcome of the
election by deviating.
Let us finally check that there is no other equilibrium in which none of the
candidates is randomizing in her choice of platform. There are seven remain-
ing platform configurations to consider: (i) (x1, x2) = (R,R), (ii) (x1, x2) =
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(C,L), (iii) (x1, x2) = (C,C), (iv) (x1, x2) = (R,C), (v) (x1, x2) = (C,R), (vi)
(x1, x2) = (R,L), and (vii) (x1, x2) = (L,C). It is a straightforward exercise
to verify the following. In case (i)-(iv) candidate 1 wins. In case (i) and (ii),
however, candidate 1 has an incentive to deviate to L; in case (iii) and (iv),
candidate 2 has an incentive to deviate to R respectively to L. In case (v)-(vii)
candidate 2 wins. In case (v) and (vi), candidate 1 has an incentive to deviate
to L; in case (vii), candidate 1 has an incentive to deviate to C or R. ¤
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